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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Morgan appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Order 
Retaining Jurisdiction and asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. The district court denied Mr. Morgan's motion to suppress based upon a 
finding that Officer Stace had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Morgan had 
violated either Idaho Code § 49-428 (display of plates and stickers) or Idaho Code § 49-
659 (stopping, standing or parking outside business or residential districts). The State 
now concedes that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress on these 
bases recognizing that Mr. Morgan did not, in fact, violate either of these two statutes. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) However, the State now asserts, for the first time on 
appeal, that Mr. Morgan's stop was justified based upon an alleged violation of Boise 
City Code § 10-11-04 (hereinafter, B.C.C. § 10-11-04), and further asserts that Officer 
Stace's belief that Mr. Morgan was either lost or was attempting to avoid him justified 
his warrantless seizure of Mr. Morgan. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's newly raised arguments. 
First, Mr. Morgan asserts that this Court should decline to address the State's argument 
that Mr. Morgan violated B.C.C. § 10-11-04 as it is being raised for the first time on 
appeal, and the State has not established that the operative facts presented and found 
by the district court support a finding that Mr. Morgan violated the ordinance. Second, if 
this Court entertains the State's argument that Mr. Morgan violated B.C.C. § 10-11-04, 
this Court should find that the ordinance is void ab initio as Boise City ceded its ability to 
regulate the streets of Boise to the Ada County Highway District and has no legal 
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authority to pass a parking regulation. Third, even if this Court both addresses the 
alleged violation of B.C.C. § 10-11-04 and finds that the ordinance is valid, it should 
nevertheless find that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Stace to believe Mr. Morgan parked in 
violation of the ordinance. Finally, this Court should affirm the district court's finding that 
Officer Stace did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity merely 
because Mr. Morgan appeared be either lost or trying to avoid him. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Morgan's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief in 
depth, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Morgan's motion to suppress as his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Morgan's Motion To Suppress As His 
Fourth Amendment Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Seizures Was Violated 
A. Introduction 
The State concedes that the district court erred in finding that Officer Stace had a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Morgan had violated either I.C. § 49-428 or 
I.C. § 49-659. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) This Court should reject the State's 
alternative argument, raised for the first time in its Respondent's Brief, that Officer Stace 
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Morgan had violated B.C.C. § 10-11-04, 
and should further affirm the district court's finding that Officer Stace had no other 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. 
B. This Court Should Reject The State's Argument, Raised For The First Time On 
Appeal, That The Warrantless Stop Was Reasonable Based Upon An Alleged 
Violation Of B.C.C. § 10-11-04 
As a general rule, appellate courts will not review claims raised for the first time 
on appeal. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). However, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has established that because the reasonableness of a seizure is judged by an 
objective standard, an appellate court may review the propriety of a warrantless seizure, 
regardless of the district court's ruling on the issue, by reviewing the "operative facts" to 
see if they justify the warrantless seizure on an alternative basis. See State v. Julian, 
129 Idaho 133 (1996). 
In Julian, the defendant was arrested at a hospital, without a warrant, based 
upon probable cause to believe that he had committed the crime of domestic violence at 
his home and, during a standard inventory search at the jail, a small vial of cocaine fell 
4 
out of the defendant's shoe. Id. at 134. The district court granted the defendant's 
motion to suppress finding that his arrest was unlawful under the then-existing Idaho 
arrest statute, which arguably barred an arrest for a crime stemming from a "domestic 
disturbance" when not made at the scene of the disturbance. Id. at 134-135; I.C. § 19-
603(6) (1993). Recognizing that the existence of probable cause to arrest is an 
objective standard freely reviewed on appeal, and relying upon Klingler v. United States, 
409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1969), the "lead opinion" concluded that, 
the officer's decision to cite Julian for domestic battery does not foreclose 
an inquiry into whether an objective assessment of the facts present at the 
moment of arrest would lead a person of ordinary prudence to conclude 
that probable cause existed to arrest Julian for a felony arising from 
the same operative facts supporting the domestic battery arrest, i.e. 
aggravated battery . 
... [W]e hold that an objective assessment of the facts found by the district 
court gave the deputies probable cause to arrest Julian for aggravated 
battery. 
Id. at 135-137 (emphasis added).1 The Court reversed the district court's suppression 
of the evidence. Id. 
In the present case, the operative facts presented to and found by the district 
court do not justify a seizure2 based upon an alleged violation of B.C.C. § 10-11-04. 
1 Justice Silak, joined by Judge Lansing, Pro Tem, wrote the "lead" opinion in this case 
and found that it was not necessary to determine whether the district court correctly 
interpreted I.C. § 19-603(6). Justice Walters, Pro Tem, joined by Judge Drescher, Pro 
Tem, found "[t]he Court's lead opinion ably and thoughtfully applies the holding of 
Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1969)", but determined that the arrest 
itself did not violate I.C. § 19-603(6). In State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463 (1999), a 
unanimous Court referenced this portion of the julian opinion as the Court's 
"conclu[sion]." Id. at 468 (quoting Julian, 129 Idaho at 137.) Therefore, the Julian 
analysis is a correct statement of Idaho law. 
2 The Julian Court looked to the operative facts to determine if probable cause to justify 
a warrantless arrest existed, whereas in the present case, the question is whether a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a warrantless seizure is at 
issue. As both probable cause to arrest and reasonable suspicion to seize are objective 
5 
First and foremost, the State failed to prove the existence of the ordinance in the district 
court. The existence of an ordinance is a factual question that must be proven to the 
trier of fact. See Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867 (1988); People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho 
681 (1878). In Marcher, a "slip and fall case" wherein the plaintiff "tersely mentioned a 
violation of the Blaine County Building Code, but failed to attach a copy of that 
ordinance" in a response to a motion for summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court's grant of the defendant's summary judgment motion. 
Marcher, 113 Idaho at 867-870. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the 
district court should have taken judicial notice of the building code, noting that 
"[i]nasmuch as [I.C. § 9-101] only permits a court to take judicial notice of legislative 
acts, it follows that the court may not take judicial notice of city ordinances or of the 
various codes adopted under them." Id. at 870. 
Furthermore, after summary judgment was granted, the plaintiff filed a '''Motion to 
Alter or Amended Judgment''' and attached a copy of the Blaine County ordinances in 
question in a supporting memorandum; however, the district court denied the motion. 
Id. at 868-869. In affirming the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion, the 
Supreme Court recognized, "[b]ecause this motion attempts to present new information 
which the trial court did not have before it when rendering its decision granting summary 
judgment, the motion must be considered a motion for relief from judgment under 
I.R.C.P. 60(b), at least with regard to the issue of negligence per se for violation of a 
safety statute." Id. at 870. The Court determined that the failure to present the 
standards subject to de novo review, the "operative facts" analysis should be equally 
applied to each type of case. See Julian, supra; see also State v. Benefiel, 131 Idaho 
226 (1998). 
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evidence of the ordinances to the district court was "at best ... a mistaken 
understanding as to the ability to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, or at 
worst, the municipal ordinance argument was not contemplated by Marcher until after 
the decision granting summary judgment." Id. at 871. 
Neither the prosecutor nor Officer Stace ever mentioned the existence of 
B.C.C. § 10-11-04, let alone provide any actual proof that it was legally adopted. 
(R., ppAO-41; Tr. 6/15/10.) The State cannot make the argument impliedly made by the 
plaintiff in Marcher that it merely misunderstood the rules regarding judicial notice, an 
excuse the Marcher Court did not abide. The State simply did not think of raising this 
argument until after it received Mr. Morgan's Appellant's Brief and recognized, by its 
own admission, the district court erred in affirming Mr. Morgan's warrantess seizure on 
the bases proffered by the prosecutor and Officer Stace. Even if the district court could 
have taken judicial notice of B.C.C. § 10-11-04, it simply did not do so and this operative 
fact was not found by the district court. The State's lack of diligence in presenting any 
evidence of the existence of the parking ordinance in this case should not be glossed 
over by this Court in the name of affirming the denial of Mr. Morgan's suppression 
motion, as the State would have this Court do. This operative fact was not proven in 
the district court and, thus, cannot be cited by this Court as a basis to conclude 
Mr. Morgan's seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
In raising the argument that this Court should find that the stop was justified 
based upon an alleged violation of B.C.C. § 10-11-04, the State makes the general 
claim that an appellate Court will affirm the order of a district court where the district 
court reaches the correct result by an incorrect theory. (Respondent's Brief, p.6 (citing 
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McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704 
(1997).) However, the State has not cited any authority that overturns Julian and 
applies this "right result - wrong reason" theory of appellate review in the context of 
review of a district court's decision that would allow the appellate court to determine a 
suppression issue based upon facts neither presented nor found by the district court. 
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the Julian analysis in State v. Schwarz, 
133 Idaho 463 (1999); see also See State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 515 fn.4 (2010) 
(reiterating the general prohibition against an appellate court hearing an argument for 
the first time on appeal, but deciding to hear the State's argument that the "good faith 
exception" to the exclusionary due to a change in United States Supreme Court 
precedent between the time the case was heard in the district court and the Court of 
Appeals, and the time the case was heard in the Idaho Supreme Court). 
In essence, the State is asking this Court to be a finder of face This Court 
should decline this invitation. It is well established that this Court, as an appellate 
tribunal, does not engage in its own fact finding on review. See, e.g., State v. Meister, 
3 Curiously, the State has failed to provide sufficient evidence of the existence of B.C.C. 
10-11-04 on this appeal. Appendix A of the Respondent's Brief appears to be a printout 
taken directly from the city's official website. Compare Respondent's Brief, Appendix A 
with http://www.cityofboise.org/Departments/City_Clerk/PDF/CityCodeITitle1 0/1 011.pdf 
(pages 3 of 14 to 5 of 14.) However, the city's website itself contains a preface to the 
purported code sections stating, 
This is the unofficial copy of the Boise City Code and does not legally 
bind the City in anyway. This Code is published for reference purposes 
only, it may not reflect recent changes to the code and should not be 
used for any official purpose. For an official copy of any part of the 
Boise City Code - Please contact the Office of the City Clerk. The Boise 
City Code is the sole property of the City of Boise, any unauthorized use 
or modification of this code is illegal. 
See http://www.cityofboise.org/Departments/City_ClerklCityCode/index.aspx (emphasis 
added). 
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148 Idaho 236, 239 (2009) (concluding that the appellate courts are not fact-finding 
tribunals and declining to make a determination on the admissibility of the evidence at 
issue); Lynch v. Lynch, 106 Idaho 842,845-846 (1984) (it is an invasion of the province 
of the trial for an appellate court to readjudicate controverted facts); Thomas v. Klein, 99 
Idaho 105, 109 (1978) (scope of appellate review is limited, and appellate court will not 
retry issues of fact or substitute its view of such issues for the trial court). The State had 
an opportunity in the district court to present facts sufficient to justify Mr. Morgan's 
warrantless seizure. By its own admission, the State failed to do so. This Court should 
not give the State an opportunity to argue facts never presented to or found by the 
district court in the hope of saving its unconstitutional seizure of Mr. Morgan. 
Furthermore, even if this Court excuses the State's failure to prove B.C.C. § 10-
11-04 in the district court, there are still inadequate operative facts to justify an appellate 
finding that the seizure was valid. By its express terms, B.C.C. § 10-11-04(D) (the 
specific subsection relied upon by the State), does not apply "in a business or restricted 
parking district." B.C.C. § 10-11-04(D). The State failed to provide any evidence that 
the location of the stop was neither in a business district nor a restricted parking district. 
(R., pp.40-41; Tr. 6/15/10.) The district court was not asked to, nor did it make such a 
finding; therefore, this operative fact was not proven and this Court should not 
retroactively find Mr. Morgan's seizure was justified based upon the State's newly found 
appellate theory. (R., pp.40-41, 51-56; Tr. 6/15/10.) 
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C. If This Court Entertains The State's Argument That Mr. Morgan Violated Boise 
City Code § 10-11-04, This Court Should Find That Boise City Did Not Have The 
Authority To Enact This Parking Regulation; Thus, It Has No Legal Effect And 
Cannot Be The Basis For The Stop 
Mr. Morgan asserts that the City did not have the authority to enact the 
B.C.C. § 10-11-04, as the Ada County Highway District (hereinafter, ACHD) and the 
State have sale jurisdiction over all of the highways located within Ada County, including 
those within the City of Boise.4 If the City did not have the authority to enact the 
ordinance, then Mr. Morgan's stop cannot be justified on the basis of an alleged 
violation of B.C.C. § 10-11-04.5 
Mr. Morgan asserts that, other than the State, the ACHD has sale jurisdiction 
over all highways within Ada County, including those within the City. Id. Article III, § 1, 
of the Idaho Constitution vests all legislative power, other than the referendum and 
initiative power reserved to the people, in the Legislature. IDAHO CONST. Art. III, § 1. 
Article XII, § 2, of the Idaho Constitution provides, "Any county or incorporated city or 
town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local, police, sanitary and other 
4 Mr. Morgan fully recognizes that this argument is more appropriately made in the 
district court and generally should not be raised for the first time on appeal. However, 
the State never attempted to justify Mr. Morgan's warrantless seizure based upon 
B.C.C. § 10-11-04 until its Respondent's Brief. If this Court entertains the State's new 
theory for the first time on appeal, due process dictates hearing Mr. Morgan's 
constitutional and statutory challenge for the first time on appeal as well. C.f. 
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-476 (1973) ("hold[ing] that in the absence of a 
strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. 
The State may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense 
witnesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses. 
It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case 
while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of 
the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State.") 
5 The State cannot rely upon a claim that Officer Stace was acting in "good faith" 
reliance on B.C.C. § 10-11-04 as Officer State was not acting in reliance of B.C.C. 10-
11-04 at all. See Tr. 6/15/10, p.14, Ls.20-22; See also Frederick, 149 Idaho at 517. 
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regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws." IDAHO CONST. 
Art. XII, § 2. 
State law defines a "[s]ingle highway traffic district" as consisting of "all public 
highways within the county, including those within all cities of the county, but excepting 
those within the state highway system and those under federal controL" 
I.C. § 40-120(4) (emphasis added.) Idaho Code § 40-113(3) provides, '''Local highway 
jurisdiction' means a county with jurisdiction over a highway system, a city with 
jurisdiction over a highway system, or a highway district." I.C. § 40-113(3) (emphasis 
added). Idaho Code. § 40-104(1), in relevant part, provides, '''City system' means all 
public highways within the corporate limits of a city, with a functioning street 
department, except those highways which are ... part of a highway district system .... " 
I.C. § 40-104(1) (emphasis added). 
From these statutes, it is clear that Idaho cities lack jurisdiction over any 
highways that are within a single highway traffic district because such highways are no 
longer part of the city's system of highways. Only the State and the single highway 
traffic district can exercise jurisdiction over highways located within such a district. 
The ACHD was established in 1972, and "is the only consolidated countywide 
highway district in the State of Idaho."s As such, the ACHD has exclusive jurisdiction 
over any and all highways located within Ada County, including those within the City. 
Under state law, the term highways includes all "roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid 
out or established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public." 
I.C. § 40-109(5). Under this definition, Mr. Morgan parked on a "highway" at the time of 
11 
his seizure and that highway was within the City of Boise. Therefore, only the ACHD 
and the State had jurisdiction over his conduct. 
Idaho Code § 49-208, in relevant part, provides: 
(1) The provisions of this title shall not be deemed to prevent local 
authorities with respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the 
reasonable exercise of the police power from: 
(a) Regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing or parking; 
(b) Regulating traffic by means of peace officers or traffic-control devices[.] 
I.C. § 49-208 (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 49-207(1), in relevant part, provides, 
"These provisions of law shall not be construed to prevent cities from enacting and 
enforcing general ordinances prescribing additional requirements as to speed, manner 
of driving, or operating vehicles on any of the highways of such cities .... " I.C. § 49-207 
(emphasis added). 
These provisions grant a municipal corporation the ability, in general, to regulate 
the highways within their boundaries. However, the City of Boise has ceded its 
authority, granted by the Idaho Constitution and Idaho code, to ACHD. Idaho Code § 
40-1310, in relevant part, provides: 
(1) The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general 
supervision and jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way 
within their highway system .... 
(8) The highway district board of commissioners shall have the exclusive 
general supervisory authority over all public highways, public streets and 
public rights-of-way under their jurisdiction, with full power to establish 
design standards, establish use standards, pass resolutions and establish 
regulations in accordance with the provisions of title 49, Idaho Code, and 
6 ACHD, "About Us," at http://www.achdidaho.org/AboutACHD/Default.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 20,2011). 
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control access to said public highways, public streets and public rights-of-
way. 
I.C. § 40-1310 (emphases added). By ceding its power to regulate highways within the 
City of Boise to the ACHD, the City of Boise ceded its power to enact B.C.C. § 10-11-
04. 
"Idaho has long recognized the proposition that a municipal corporation, as a 
creature of the state, possesses and exercises only those powers either expressly or 
impliedly granted to it." Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158,160 (1980). In Black v. Young, 
122 Idaho 302 (1992), this Court noted that, when a city acts without lawful authority, 
such an act is ultra vires and considered null and void. Id. at 308-309. Mr. Morgan 
asserts that it is clear, under any reasonable reading of the relevant provisions of 
I.C. § 40-1310 and the portions of title 49 set forth above, that the ACHD and the State 
had exclusive jurisdiction to enact regulations governing the operation of motor vehicles 
on all highways within Ada County. The City of Boise lacked any such jurisdiction by 
operation of those statutes. 
Mr. Morgan asserts that because the City lacked jurisdiction to enact the 
ordinance (or any ordinance that regulates the operation of motor vehicles on highways 
within the ACHD), it is null and void ab initio and, as a matter of law, never existed. 
Because the ordinance was never valid, it cannot be used by the either the State or this 
Court as retroactive justification for Mr. Morgan's warrantless seizure. 
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D. If This Court Reaches The Merits Of The State's Argument That Mr. Morgan's 
Stop Was Justified Due To His Alleged Violation Of B.C.C. § 10-11-04, It Should 
Find That Under The Facts Presented, It Was Objectively Unreasonable For 
Officer Stace To Seize Mr. Morgan Based Upon This Alleged Violation 
Even if this Court reaches the merits of the State's newly raised claim, it should 
find that the facts presented do not support a finding that it was objectively reasonable 
for Officer Stace to believe Mr. Morgan was violating B.C.C. § 10-11-04. As noted in 
Section B above, the State failed to provide any evidence of the existence of B.C.C. 
§1 0-11-04, and further failed to provide any evidence that Mr. Morgan was not parked in 
either a business district nor a restricted parking zone, both of which are necessary 
findings of fact to support an objectively reasonable suspicion of Mr. Morgan violating 
this municipal code section. This Court should decline the State's invitation to affirm the 
denial of Mr. Morgan's suppression motion based upon its newly proposed theory, in the 
absence of sufficient evidence to support its theory. 
E. Officer Stace Did Not Possess A Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That 
Mr. Morgan Was Involved In Criminal Activity To Justify His Seizure 
The district court found that "It goes without saying that Officer Stace's suspicion 
that Mr. Morgan was avoiding him was not the type of suspicion sufficient to permit an 
investigatory stop and detention." (R., p.53.) The State challenges the district court's 
legal determination in this regard. The State's argument is without merit. 
The State asserts that "[i]t was reasonable for Officer Stace to suspect, based on 
Morgan's driving pattern and subsequent stop in the street, that ... Morgan was 
attempting to conceal his actions from him." (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) The State 
then relies upon Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) and United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266 (2002), for the position that "[a]ttempts to avoid police, then, are a 
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pertinent factor in deciding whether an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity." (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15.) 
However, a perceived attempt to avoid police is not, in and of itself, sufficient to 
justify a warrantless seizure. In Wardlow, the defendant's seizure was not justified 
merely because it looked to the officer like he was trying to avoid police contact; rather, 
the defendant was in area known for heavy drug trafficking, saw four police cars drive 
up, dropped a bag he was holding, and ran from the police. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121-
122. The Wardlow Court recognized that both being in a high-crime area and 
"[h]eadlong flight" can be considered, in a totality of the circumstance analysis, when 
determining whether an officer has an objectively reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant may be involved in criminal activity, and found that the officer in the present 
case was justified in suspecting the defendant was involved in criminal activity. Id. at 
124-125.) This findings are far from radical considering long standing Supreme Court 
precedent that looks to the totality of the circumstances and objectively reviews the 
facts as found. 
The Wardlow Court, continued, 
Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), where we held that 
when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, 
approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the 
police and go about his business. Id., at 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319. And any 
"refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal 
level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure." 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 
(1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. 
Flight, by its very nature, is not "going about one's business"; in fact, it is 
just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the 
fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right 
to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of 
police questioning. 
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Id. at 125 (emphasis added). Importantly, the Wardlow Court rejected the State of 
Illinois' request for a '''bright-line rule' authorizing the temporary detention of anyone 
who flees at the mere sight of a police officer. Id. at 126-127 (J. Stevens concurring in 
part, dissenting in part (recognizing the majority's rejection of the "bright-line rule" 
request).) In other words, looking like one wants to avoid an interaction with an officer 
is far different then seeing an officer and running away and seeing an officer and 
running away is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify a warrantless seizure. 
The State basically asks this Court to adopt that which the Wardlow Court 
rejected - a "bright-line rule" that would allow any officer to seize any person at any time 
merely because that person appeared to be avoiding the officer. The State would have 
this Court hold that exercising ones rights provides an officer with the very basis to 
seize a person. Such a holding would write the Fourth Amendment out of existence. 
The mere fact that the State can point to additional facts, such as it was 9:20 
p.m. on a Friday night, when the officer saw an SUV that did not have a front license 
plate, and drive around the block and parked along the side of the road, does not make 
the State's argument more compelling. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.13-16.) In reality, 
the facts relied upon by the State show that Officer Stace had a "hunch" that 
Mr. Morgan was either up to no good or was just lost, but a hunch is simply not enough 
to justify a warrantless seizure. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 at 27. The district court 
declined to adopt the State's spurious argument and this Court should decline to 
overrule the district court on this basis. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Morgan respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
of judgment and commitment, reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress, 
and remand his case to the district court with instructions that all evidence obtained 
after his seizure must be suppressed. 
DATED this 21 st day of December, 2011. 
JA ON C. PINTL 
De uty State Appellate Public Defender 
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